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Abstract
In this paper, we offer a new account of disability. According to our account, some state of a person’s
biology or psychology is a disability if that state makes it more likely that a person’s life will get worse, in
terms of his or her own wellbeing, in a given set of social and environmental circumstances. Unlike the
medical model of disability, our welfarist approach does not tie disability to deviation from normal
species’ functioning, nor does it understand disability in essentialist terms. Like the social model of dis-
ability, the welfarist approach sees disability as a harmful state that results from the interaction between a
person’s biology and psychology and his or her surrounding environment. However, unlike the social
model, it denies that the harm associated with disability is entirely due to social prejudice or injustice. In
this paper, we outline and clarify the welfarist approach, answer common objections and illustrate its
usefulness in addressing a range of difﬁcult ethical questions involving disability.
Many people believe that it would be wrong deliberately to
create a child with deafness or dwarﬁsm when it is possible
to create a healthy, hearing child.
1 They believe that such
procreative choices are wrong because deafness and dwarf-
ism are disabilities – conditions that are abnormal and
negatively deviate from normal human species’ function-
ing and which are therefore harmful and which we
should generally try to prevent or correct. This set of
beliefs is formalized as the ‘medical model’ of disability.
By contrast, those who want to have children with these
conditions vehemently deny that there is anything inher-
ently undesirable about deafness or dwarﬁsm. They often
appeal to what some disability advocates call the ‘social
model’ of disability, according to which deviation from
normal human functioning is disadvantageous – if disad-
vantageous at all – only because of social prejudice.
These are two sides to a longstanding and bitter dispute
about the concept of disability.
2
Our aim in this paper is not to criticize existing
approaches but to propose an alternative approach: the
welfarist account of disability.
3 The advantage of the wel-
farist approach, we believe, is that it incorporates the
insights contained in both the medical and social models
but avoids their more implausible aspects.
4 Like the
social model, the welfarist approach denies that normal
functioning is in itself morally signiﬁcant.
5 But like the
medical model, it does not take social prejudice to be
the sole or even key source of the disadvantage associated
with disability.
In what follows, we introduce the welfarist approach
and explain its main features. We believe that common
conceptions of disability, encapsulated by the medical
model, are often an obstacle to clear ethical thinking.
6
This is why, like the social model, the welfarist approach
is revisionist: it is not meant as a straightforward analysis
of the everyday use of the word ‘disability’. We end this
paper by illustrating how our approach sheds better light
on controversial reproductive choices and some other
ethical disputes about disability – and thus, we hope,
also demonstrate why the current understanding of disabil-
ity should be revised.
Introducing the welfarist account
According to the welfarist account of disability, ‘disability’
should refer to any stable physical or psychological prop-
erty of subject S that leads to a signiﬁcant reduction of
S’s level of wellbeing in circumstances C, excluding the
effect that this condition has on wellbeing that is due to
prejudice against S by members of S’s society.
7 Several
aspects of this account require clariﬁcation.
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A ‘stable physical or psychological property’ of a person is
not the same as an ‘impairment’, if this notion is taken to
be synonymous with some deviation from normality. We
are referring to any intrinsic property of the agent. Thus,
unlike the traditional medical model, the welfarist
account makes no reference to biological or statistical nor-
mality: whether or not a condition is normal or deviates
from normality is not an intrinsic property of a person.
This means that, as we shall see, some things will count
as disabilities in our sense that we might not describe as
disabilities in the everyday sense of the word.
In-built normativity
Although our deﬁnition does not use explicit evaluative
and normative terms, we do refer to the concept of well-
being, which has inherent normative signiﬁcance. If some-
thing leads to a reduction in someone’s wellbeing, then
that thing is bad for that person. This means that if some-
thing is a disability in our sense, then it is also by deﬁ-
nition a condition that makes life worse, and gives prima
facie reasons to address it. In this respect, the welfarist
approach captures the thinking behind clinical specialties
at the fringes of conventional medicine, especially pallia-
tive medicine, in which a patient’s own conception of
wellbeing is taken by clinicians to be normative, and treat-
ment offered only if it will improve it.
Intrinsic value
Our deﬁnition refers to what is of intrinsic value: well-
being. When something reduces someone’s wellbeing,
then what is intrinsically bad is the harm it does – the
reduction of wellbeing. Importantly, the cause of that
reduction is only instrumentally bad or harmful. While we
may have some reason to correct it as a means to removing
the intrinsic harm, we could equally remove the harm by
changing the circumstances in which the effects are ren-
dered harmful. There is thus no overriding reason to
correct conditions that count as disabilities in the welfarist
sense. The question whether to change a person’s biology
psychology or environment will be determined by con-
siderations such as cost, safety, ease and justice.
8
Context dependence
According to the welfarist account, disability in our sense
is relative to both persons and circumstances (we refer to
circumstances C, but this could stand for a long list). In
its everyday use, ‘disability’ is not context-dependent.
Everyday use not only mistakenly implies that deviations
from the species norm are bad, but also seems to imply
that they are bad in themselves, quite independently of
context.
On the welfarist account, by contrast, disability is
context-dependent. What makes leading a good life
harder in one circumstance, may make it easier in
another. The disposition to rest and store excess calories
as fat is an advantage in a world of limited resources but
a serious disadvantage in a world of excess calories and
limited physical activity. Deafness would be an advantage
in an environment of extremely loud and distracting
noise.
9 In order to judge which conditions constitute a dis-
ability, we need to know what class of people is being
referred to, and to predict what the context or environ-
ment is likely to be. There is no context-independent
answer to such a question.
We deliberately deﬁned disability to be relative to a
speciﬁc person and set of circumstances. When we con-
sider questions about individuals’ own wellbeing, this is
the normative reference point – the wellbeing of the
‘average’ or ‘common’ person has no independent moral
standing. Indeed, it has no direct relevance. That there
are many people starving does not make my starvation
less bad for me. Nevertheless, for the purposes of social
policy, we often need to speak in generalities. Certain
foods, substances, activities, temperatures, etc. are
harmful to most human beings. But that does not change
the point that many things can be harmful or disabling
to one person but not to another; harmful to a person at
one time but not in another; or harmful in one set of cir-
cumstances and not in another. Folate is generally ben-
eﬁcial to people, important for health and the
prevention of birth defects, but if given to a person with
vitamin B12 deﬁciency, it can be lethal.
Excludes social prejudice
We have deliberately deﬁned ‘disability’ in a way that
excludes the effect on wellbeing that a condition has as
a result of social prejudice. Advocates of the social
model are no doubt right that some of the adverse effects
of deviation from the species norm are due to such preju-
dice. We disagree, however, that all of the ways in which
common disabilities can reduce wellbeing are entirely due
to prejudice.
10 And although our welfarist account is some-
what revisionary, to deﬁne ‘disability’ to refer exclusively
to such prejudice seems too revisionary. Talk about preju-
dice towards disabled people would be a tautology, and it
would thus make no sense to say that some society is pre-
judiced against disabled people. Moreover, although our
account makes it clear that disabilities reduce wellbeing
only in a given context, we deny that this context must
always be social, or that when it is social, it must always
reﬂect prejudice or injustice. Even if many of the limitations
imposed by deafness are due to the fact that many social
arrangements are designed for hearing people, it does not
automatically follow that all of these social arrangements
are unjust.
11
Everyone suffers from disability
An atopic constitution (the tendency to develop allergic
responses) is a disability in modern society. It can result
in asthma and eczema. Asthma is instrumentally bad
because it makes breathing more difﬁcult in certain
environments commonly encountered in the developed
world – dusty or smoky environments or places with
pets. It can make it more difﬁcult to enjoy the company
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About 20% of people who have asthma nowadays are
mildly disabled by virtue of it. Myopia is an example of
another common but very mild disability. Dyslexia is
another. All of us can be said to suffer from disabilities –
conditions inherent to our nature which reduce our well-
being and make it more difﬁcult to realize a good life in
the context we inhabit.
On the welfarist account, illness is a form of disability.
The priority which we attach to disease or illness being
treated or researched is proportional to the degree to
which it is disabling. Some illnesses have so little impact
on a person’s life that such ill people have very little
claim to treatment, despite the fact that their biological
functioning might signiﬁcantly deviate from the species-
typical norm.
12
People sometimes associate disability with visible and
overt features of people’s bodies, or with very severe mental
limitations. But genetics, biology and psychology will
identify many other internal features of people to be impe-
diments to wellbeing. It may turn out, for example, that
having poor impulse control is, in many contexts, a far
greater obstacle to a good life than being deaf or missing
an arm.
13 That is, having poor impulse control may
adversely affect wellbeing, and thus be a far greater disabil-
ity than losing an arm, even if the intuitions of many will
militate against this claim. The fact that certain properties
of people are more salient than others may distort our
understanding of the weight they have in shaping
people’s lives and the proper prioritization of medical
research and treatment. Our welfarist account tries to
correct this distortion by deﬁning disability in a broader
and more inclusive way.
More importantly, it provides a metric for prioritizing
medical research and treatment, along the lines of the
‘global burden of disease’ but with a ﬁrm and appropriate
focus on what ultimately and intrinsically matters:
human wellbeing.
Reference to wellbeing
To determine whether some condition counts as a disabil-
ity in the welfarist sense, we need to conduct two separate
inquiries, one normative and one empirical. First, we need
to agree upon and adopt an account of wellbeing. Then we
need to identify the causal factors that inﬂuence a person’s
wellbeing in a certain set of circumstances.
It is thus a substantive question, not determined by
deﬁnition alone, whether the paradigmatic cases of disabil-
ity in the everyday sense – e.g. deafness, blindness and
cognitive impairment – are disabilities. We ourselves are
inclined to believe most of these are, in the conditions
holding at present and in the foreseeable future. But
note that although it might be possible to make a
general case that, say, blindness is a disability for most
people in the common circumstances holding in our
world, it may still be true that an opposite case can be
made for a particular person, in special and speciﬁc circum-
stances. For example, it may be true that for a person living
exclusively and sufﬁciently within a well resourced deaf
community, deafness might be a trivial disability.
14
Objections to the welfarist account
Does it prejudge the normative issues?
Since on our deﬁnition it is tautological that disability is
bad for those suffering from it, and we have reasons to
remove disabilities, this account might be thought to fore-
close certain genuine normative questions about disability,
about whether disabilities are genuinely bad or harmful.
The normativity is already written into the concept.
However, we believe that the inherent normativity is a
strength, not a weakness. Moore’s Open Question
Argument easily reveals that ‘disability’ is a normative
concept in ordinary usage: it would make no sense to
say, ‘I know that X is a disability, but is it bad?’
Importantly, our deﬁnition does not foreclose any
genuine normative question. On the contrary, it makes it
impossible to move from a certain neutral relational
empirical property (deviation from the norm) to a tenden-
tious normative conclusion simply through a semantic
detour. But the conceptual tie between wellbeing, value
and reasons is acknowledged by any sane normative view.
What our deﬁnition does is direct attention to the nor-
mative questions that really matter here: questions about
what affects human wellbeing. This, we believe, is of
central importance. But once empirical facts are under-
stood and an account of wellbeing is agreed, there is no
further intrinsic normative issue about disability that
remains open.
15 There are of course other normative con-
siderations that might be relevant: other people’s well-
being, distributive justice, desert or other issues given
importance by an individual’s moral theory. But these
other considerations were there anyway.
Two further remarks. First, as noted above, although
disability implies reasons to change the situation –
reasons to improve wellbeing – it does not necessarily
imply reasons to correct the disabling condition. It leaves
open, as it should, the question whether to change the
person or his/her environment. Second, the reasons
issued are in any case only prima facie reasons. The concep-
tual tie is not to what one has conclusive reason or what one
necessarily ought to do. Thus, while there will always be
some reason to avoid disability (by changing either the
person or environment), there may sometimes be overall
reasons to accept or sometimes even promote disability
in a given context. The normative questions are not at
all foreclosed at this level.
Isn’t it useless, because there is too much
disagreement about what makes one person’s
life better than another?
What constitutes a good life is a difﬁcult philosophical
question.
16 It has also been the subject of extensive socio-
logical, anthropological, psychological and economic
enquiry. One of the most urgent tasks, according to the
welfarist account, is to agree upon a substantive account
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puted but nonetheless urgent and ultimate question.
Within philosophy, over the last 2500 years, there
have been three dominant approaches. According to hedo-
nistic theories, it consists of having pleasant experi-
ences and being happy. According to desire-fulﬁlment
theories, what matters is having our preferences fulﬁlled.
According to objective good theories, certain activities
are intrinsically good – developing deep personal relation-
ships and talents, gaining knowledge, and so on. But
although these are opposing accounts of the nature of well-
being, they might nevertheless often signiﬁcantly agree
about what particular things make life go better or worse.
Thus, for example, hedonism and desire-satisfaction the-
ories typically claim that signiﬁcant relationships and
achievements are good because they give us pleasure or
satisfy our strong desires. Objective good theories typically
recognize the value of pleasure and pain and think that our
informed desires often track what is independently good.
This convergence is not surprising, since these are all com-
peting accounts of our everyday concept of wellbeing, and
as such are likely to preserve many of our pre-theoretical
beliefs about wellbeing – beliefs that are indeed diverse,
but also share a large core. To fail to see this is to fail to
distinguish the theory of wellbeing and the sources of
wellbeing.
It is important to stress that while there is disagree-
ment about wellbeing, there is also much consensus. Few
if any would deny that chronic pain tends to make a life
worse, or that joy makes a life better. All plausible moral
theories have to make such judgements – judgements
about harms and beneﬁts, or things that make a life go
better or worse. Our welfarist account does not rely on
some special and controversial conception of wellbeing.
All it asks us is to apply the same concepts we already
employ in everyday situations. And every day we make
implicit judgements about what is good and better for
people when we form social policies, develop priorities
for research, educate our children and prioritize social
institutions and practices.
The welfarist account in action
We will now brieﬂy consider some examples of ethical dis-
putes involving disability, and illustrate how they should
be interpreted in light of the welfarist approach. We
believe that although our account sometimes leads to sur-
prising conclusions, it does a better job than the Medical
and Social models, or than the loose everyday notion of
disability, in highlighting what is of genuine ethical signiﬁ-
cance in each of these cases.
As we saw, to apply the welfarist account we need to
give answers to questions about wellbeing. But few would
deny that, in most cases, we can at least give rough
answers to questions about wellbeing, and if this is the
case, then we can also give rough answers to questions
about disability. In this section we will examine a
number of interesting cases and give such rough answers.
But these are just rough answers. There are no general arm-
chair answers to questions about disability in our sense.
Deafness and dwarﬁsm
Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCullough, a deaf
lesbian couple, had their second child Gauvin in 2001.
The women, who wanted to have a deaf child, conceived
Gauvin through artiﬁcial insemination by donor, using
sperm from a friend they knew to have ﬁve generations
of inherited deafness in his family. They argued that deaf-
ness is an identity, not a medical afﬂiction that needs to be
ﬁxed. As they put it, ‘Deafness is not a disability’. A
hearing child would be a blessing, they said, but a deaf
child would be a special blessing.
17
Some achondroplastic dwarfs have similarly sought
preimplantation genetic diagnosis to select an embryo
with dwarﬁsm, arguing that being little is not a disability,
but only a difference. They have claimed that as their
house and lifestyle have been modiﬁed for their short
stature, they would be better able to rear a short child
rather than a normal child – that if their child had achon-
droplasia, it would have a better life.
18
What are we to make of such procreative decisions?
Deafness and dwarﬁsm are obviously deviations from the
species norm. But are they also disabilities in our
sense?
19 It is arguable that deafness is instrumentally
harmful in two senses. First, it reduces the goodness of a
life by preventing access to the world of sound. A deaf
person cannot hear music, human voice or auditory
alarms. When studying in a library, deafness is not a dis-
ability – it may even be advantageous. It is the exercise
of capacity to hear that is valuable, not the capacity
itself. But the capacity to hear is, obviously, a necessary
condition for enjoying those intrinsic goods that are
necessarily auditory. And in the world the way it is, there
are plenty of such goods. Second, deafness also reduces
the chances of realizing a good life because it makes it
harder to live, to achieve one’s goals and to engage with
others in a world which is based on the spoken word.
Being able to hear is not a necessary condition for such
activities and goods. But without that ability it is neverthe-
less signiﬁcantly harder to move in the world, harder to
respond to emergencies where the alarm is aural and so
on. These difﬁculties are partly due to social circum-
stances, but, as pointed out earlier, this need not mean
that they are all due to injustice. It is also tendentious to
claim that the failure of a deaf person to hear the roar of
an approaching tiger is the result of social construction.
Of course, the world could be constructed with visual
warnings of approaching tigers, but the world could be
constructed in a near inﬁnite number of ways. Such an
approach would make all harm socially constructed.
These general claims, however, are compatible with
the claim that for particular people, in particular circum-
stances, deafness is not a genuine disability, as we have
pointed out. Indeed, for adults whose life projects are
closely tied with their condition, and who will need to
make a difﬁcult and painful transition to the world of
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hearing. For these people, hearing itself would count as a
kind of disability.
Similar considerations apply to dwarﬁsm. To us this
seems at most a mild disability, continuous with different
limitations on wellbeing that all of us have (it makes no
difference to wellbeing whether a person’s short stature is
due to a genetic abnormality or to normal genetic var-
iance). We doubt that achondroplasia does much to
reduce the quality of a person’s life once we subtract the
consequences of prejudice.
20
Body integrity identity disorder
Consider next an even more controversial case. There is a
small minority of individuals who are sometimes described
as ‘want-to-be amputees’. These individuals do not identify
with the body they were born with: a body with four limbs.
They want to remove one or more of their healthy limbs.
For at least some of them, this desire persists even after
extensive counselling and psychiatric therapy, and they
ﬁnd life with four limbs extremely depressing.
21
In most cases, losing one’s limb would be a signiﬁcant
disability, and it would consequently be a serious pruden-
tial mistake to try to amputate one’s own limb, or even
simply to risk losing it. But in the case of some of these
would-be amputees, it might actually be a disability to
possess a healthy limb, if indeed the psychological distress
is severe enough and not correctable. In these different
contexts, the same condition might amount in one case
to a harm and in another to a beneﬁt, and what would
count as ‘correcting’ a disability would be very different.
Once we drop the instinctive reliance on normality as a
normative guide, this result should not be so surprising.
It is not intrinsically bad to have only one leg just as it
is not intrinsically bad to have ‘only’ two, or three and
not eight.
Of course, to lose a leg is at least potentially to lose a
degree of mobility, and consequently some degree of well-
being. To what extent this is a loss will depend on the
sophistication of the prosthetic legs available (most
would-be amputees apparently have no qualms about
using prosthetic limbs), and as technology advances, the
negative effect on mobility will continue to diminish.
Indeed, as technology matures, prosthetics at some point
may surpass normal-functioning limbs. Then having a
normal leg would be disability for most people. But even
in the current case where prosthetic limbs are inferior in
functioning to normal limbs the negative effect of
having a prosthetic leg could still be less than the negative
effects of keeping the leg.
22
This is just a hypothesis. To properly assess it, we
would need to engage in serious empirical legwork.
23 It
cannot be decided from the armchair, from sketchy case
descriptions, let alone by gut reactions. We need to over-
come gut responses to surgery or to the ‘deformation’ of
the human ﬁgure, and to ask instead what effect such
surgery would plausibly have on particular people’s
wellbeing.
The ‘Ashley treatment’
In 2004, Ashley was a nine-year-old girl from Seattle who
was born with static encephalopathy, a severe brain impair-
ment that left her unable to walk, talk, eat, sit up or roll
over. Ashley would remain at a developmental level of a
three-month-old baby. In that year, Ashley was given
high-dose oestrogen therapy to stunt her growth, and her
uterus and breast buds were removed to prevent menstrual
discomfort and to limit the growth of her breasts. Ashley’s
parents argued that this treatment was intended ‘to
improve our daughter’s quality of life and not to conven-
ience her caregivers’.
24
On both our welfarist account and on the medical
model, Ashley was born with a severe disability.
25 But
their verdicts radically diverged when applied to the
‘Ashley treatment’. On the medical model, the treatment
would greatly increase her disability – driving her even
further from the human norm. In our view, in the context
of Ashley’s brain impairment, and assuming that the
claims made for the effects of the treatment on Ashley’s
wellbeing were correct, the treatment would be not dis-
abling but enhancing.
We think that the welfarist concept of disability does a
better job, and sheds more light on the Ashley case, than
the medical model. As for the social model, it has been
claimed by some that Ashley’s condition is detrimental
only because of adverse social circumstances and that it
is only these circumstances that need to be changed –
for example by providing further support for the parents
to lift or transfer Ashley, and so forth. This claim is
implausible. Not all the detrimental aspects of Ashley’s
condition are due to lack of social support, nor should it
be simply assumed that changes to the social circumstances
are always to be preferred or just.
26
IQ reduction
Cardiac bypass is well known to have been associated with
cognitive impairment. Imagine that a man, Jones, a man
with heart disease, undergoes coronary artery bypass graft-
ing for ischaemic heart disease. He is not told of the possi-
bility of cognitive impairment and suffers some degree of
impairment of memory, compared with previously. He
sues, claiming that his doctors disabled him. IQ testing
reveals that his IQ has dropped from 160 to 140.
Is it a disability to have an IQ of 140 instead of 160?
The average IQ is 100 and an IQ of 140 is still in the
top 2%. However, if a drop of 20 points of IQ reduces
one’s prospects for the best life, if it impedes one’s progress,
even slightly, if it makes it less likely one will achieve one’s
goals, then it reduces the expected value of one’s life and
constitutes the inﬂiction of a disability, even if only minor.
We concede that this will sound odd to many people. But
being less intelligent might have a far greater impact on a
person’s life than having only three limbs. What kind of
impact this might have on a person’s wellbeing is largely
an empirical question, and there is at least some evidence
at hand that can help us answer it.
27 Let us just point out
two general considerations. First, intelligence is at least
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life of such a drop in intelligence would to a large extent
depend on the intelligence levels of the people around
him. In our world the negative impact might be minor.
In a world where most people have 160 IQ, it would be
very substantial. Second, it makes a difference at what
point in one’s life one suffers the drop in IQ. For the
mature painter, becoming colour blind might be debilitat-
ing. For a professional mathematician, a signiﬁcant drop in
IQ is likely to be at least equally devastating. But it would
not be equally harmful if it happens to a very young child.
Conclusion
Discussion of disability has sometimes taken the form of an
acrimonious and seemingly irresolvable debate between
essentialists who think that deviation from a species
norm or other standard of normality is intrinsically bad
and always merits correction, and disability advocates
and proponents of the social model who think that to be
disabled is merely to be different, and that if there is
harm associated with it this is always due to social preju-
dice. We believe that this is not a useful way to frame
the debate. As we have argued, there is an element of
truth in the social model. Conditions are disabling only
in a given context. But essentialists are also partly right
given that, in the circumstances obtaining in our world
and in the likely future, it would be better if many com-
monly recognized disabilities were prevented or corrected.
Conceptions of disability that associate it with devi-
ation from the normal are entrenched in public discourse,
medicine and law. It would take dramatic and unlikely
conceptual revolution for these to be replaced by our
revised welfarist account. And proponents of the social
model might argue that their conception of disability has
played an important part in the ﬁght for disability rights.
Our aim in proposing a welfarist approach, however, is
somewhat more modest. We have suggested that in a
range of cases where difﬁcult ethical questions arise in con-
nection with disability, these questions are best
approached by considering ways in which various con-
ditions are likely to affect wellbeing. Reference to
normal species functioning is, at best, redundant, and
often obscures what is really at issue.
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